Daily Papers

We increase overhead for applications that rely on reasoning LLMs-we force models to spend an amplified number of reasoning tokens, i.e., "overthink", to respond to the user query while providing contextually correct answers. The adversary performs an OVERTHINK attack by injecting decoy reasoning problems into the public content that is used by the reasoning LLM (e.g., for RAG applications) during inference time. Due to the nature of our decoy problems (e.g., a Markov Decision Process), modified texts do not violate safety guardrails. We evaluated our attack across closed-(OpenAI o1, o1-mini, o3-mini) and open-(DeepSeek R1) weights reasoning models on the FreshQA and SQuAD datasets. Our results show up to 18x slowdown on FreshQA dataset and 46x slowdown on SQuAD dataset. The attack also shows high transferability across models. To protect applications, we discuss and implement defenses leveraging LLM-based and system design approaches. Finally, we discuss societal, financial, and energy impacts of OVERTHINK attack which could amplify the costs for third-party applications operating reasoning models.

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify Transformers, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks -- multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that Transformers solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how Transformers' performance will rapidly decay with increased task complexity.

Early research into data poisoning attacks against Large Language Models (LLMs) demonstrated the ease with which backdoors could be injected. More recent LLMs add step-by-step reasoning, expanding the attack surface to include the intermediate chain-of-thought (CoT) and its inherent trait of decomposing problems into subproblems. Using these vectors for more stealthy poisoning, we introduce ``decomposed reasoning poison'', in which the attacker modifies only the reasoning path, leaving prompts and final answers clean, and splits the trigger across multiple, individually harmless components. Fascinatingly, while it remains possible to inject these decomposed poisons, reliably activating them to change final answers (rather than just the CoT) is surprisingly difficult. This difficulty arises because the models can often recover from backdoors that are activated within their thought processes. Ultimately, it appears that an emergent form of backdoor robustness is originating from the reasoning capabilities of these advanced LLMs, as well as from the architectural separation between reasoning and final answer generation.

Knights and knaves problems represent a classic genre of logical puzzles where characters either tell the truth or lie. The objective is to logically deduce each character's identity based on their statements. The challenge arises from the truth-telling or lying behavior, which influences the logical implications of each statement. Solving these puzzles requires not only direct deductions from individual statements, but the ability to assess the truthfulness of statements by reasoning through various hypothetical scenarios. As such, knights and knaves puzzles serve as compelling examples of suppositional reasoning. In this paper, we introduce TruthQuest, a benchmark for suppositional reasoning based on the principles of knights and knaves puzzles. Our benchmark presents problems of varying complexity, considering both the number of characters and the types of logical statements involved. Evaluations on TruthQuest show that large language models like Llama 3 and Mixtral-8x7B exhibit significant difficulties solving these tasks. A detailed error analysis of the models' output reveals that lower-performing models exhibit a diverse range of reasoning errors, frequently failing to grasp the concept of truth and lies. In comparison, more proficient models primarily struggle with accurately inferring the logical implications of potentially false statements.

Recent advances in large reasoning models (LRMs) have enabled remarkable performance on complex tasks such as mathematics and coding by generating long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) traces. In this paper, we identify and systematically analyze a critical vulnerability we term reasoning distraction, where LRMs are diverted from their primary objective by irrelevant yet complex tasks maliciously embedded in the prompt. Through a comprehensive study across diverse models and benchmarks, we show that even state-of-the-art LRMs are highly susceptible, with injected distractors reducing task accuracy by up to 60%. We further reveal that certain alignment techniques can amplify this weakness and that models may exhibit covert compliance, following hidden adversarial instructions in reasoning while concealing them in the final output. To mitigate these risks, we propose a training-based defense that combines Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and Reinforcement Learning (RL) on synthetic adversarial data, improving robustness by over 50 points on challenging distractor attacks. Our findings establish reasoning distraction as a distinct and urgent threat to LRM reliability and provide a practical step toward safer and more trustworthy reasoning systems.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Reasoning models have demonstrated remarkable progress in solving complex and logic-intensive tasks by generating extended Chain-of-Thoughts (CoTs) prior to arriving at a final answer. Yet, the emergence of this "slow-thinking" paradigm, with numerous tokens generated in sequence, inevitably introduces substantial computational overhead. To this end, it highlights an urgent need for effective acceleration. This survey aims to provide a comprehensive overview of recent advances in efficient reasoning. It categorizes existing works into three key directions: (1) shorter - compressing lengthy CoTs into concise yet effective reasoning chains; (2) smaller - developing compact language models with strong reasoning capabilities through techniques such as knowledge distillation, other model compression techniques, and reinforcement learning; and (3) faster - designing efficient decoding strategies to accelerate inference. A curated collection of papers discussed in this survey is available in our GitHub repository.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in reasoning and generation across domains, but still struggle with identifying and diagnosing complex errors. This stems mainly from training objectives that prioritize correct answers, limiting exposure to and learning from errors. While recent studies have begun to address this by introducing error signals, most rely on shallow, static errors, restricting improvement in deep diagnostic ability. To overcome this, we propose Hide and Seek Game (HSG), a dynamic adversarial framework for error generation and diagnosis, and evaluate it on mathematical problem-solving. HSG involves two adversarial roles: Sneaky, which "hides" by generating subtle, deceptive reasoning errors, and Diagnosis, which "seeks" to accurately detect them. Through adversarial co-evolution, both error stealth and diagnostic precision are enhanced. Experiments on several math reasoning tasks show that HSG significantly boosts error diagnosis, achieving 16.8\%--31.4\% higher accuracy than baselines like GPT-4o. We also release a challenging dataset of deceptive errors and diagnostic annotations as a benchmark for future research.

We demonstrate LLM agent specification gaming by instructing models to win against a chess engine. We find reasoning models like o1 preview and DeepSeek-R1 will often hack the benchmark by default, while language models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5 Sonnet need to be told that normal play won't work to hack. We improve upon prior work like (Hubinger et al., 2024; Meinke et al., 2024; Weij et al., 2024) by using realistic task prompts and avoiding excess nudging. Our results suggest reasoning models may resort to hacking to solve difficult problems, as observed in OpenAI (2024)'s o1 Docker escape during cyber capabilities testing.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have significantly advanced beyond traditional Large Language Models (LLMs) with their exceptional logical reasoning capabilities, yet these improvements introduce heightened safety risks. When subjected to jailbreak attacks, their ability to generate more targeted and organized content can lead to greater harm. Although some studies claim that reasoning enables safer LRMs against existing LLM attacks, they overlook the inherent flaws within the reasoning process itself. To address this gap, we propose the first jailbreak attack targeting LRMs, exploiting their unique vulnerabilities stemming from the advanced reasoning capabilities. Specifically, we introduce a Chaos Machine, a novel component to transform attack prompts with diverse one-to-one mappings. The chaos mappings iteratively generated by the machine are embedded into the reasoning chain, which strengthens the variability and complexity and also promotes a more robust attack. Based on this, we construct the Mousetrap framework, which makes attacks projected into nonlinear-like low sample spaces with mismatched generalization enhanced. Also, due to the more competing objectives, LRMs gradually maintain the inertia of unpredictable iterative reasoning and fall into our trap. Success rates of the Mousetrap attacking o1-mini, Claude-Sonnet and Gemini-Thinking are as high as 96%, 86% and 98% respectively on our toxic dataset Trotter. On benchmarks such as AdvBench, StrongREJECT, and HarmBench, attacking Claude-Sonnet, well-known for its safety, Mousetrap can astonishingly achieve success rates of 87.5%, 86.58% and 93.13% respectively. Attention: This paper contains inappropriate, offensive and harmful content.

Large Language Models have demonstrated strong performance on many established reasoning benchmarks. However, these benchmarks primarily evaluate structured skills like quantitative problem-solving, leaving a gap in assessing flexible, multifaceted reasoning abilities that are central to human intelligence. These abilities require integrating logical deduction with spatial awareness and constraint satisfaction, which current evaluations do not measure well. To address this, we introduce RiddleBench, a benchmark of 1,737 challenging puzzles in English designed to probe these core reasoning capabilities. Evaluation of state-of-the-art models on RiddleBench shows fundamental weaknesses. Even top proprietary models like Gemini 2.5 Pro, o3, and Claude 4 Sonnet achieve accuracy just above 60% (60.30%, 63.37%, and 63.16%). Analysis further reveals deep failures, including hallucination cascades (accepting flawed reasoning from other models) and poor self-correction due to a strong self-confirmation bias. Their reasoning is also fragile, with performance degrading significantly when constraints are reordered or irrelevant information is introduced. RiddleBench functions as a diagnostic tool for these issues and as a resource for guiding the development of more robust and reliable language models.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

We demonstrate how AI agents can coordinate to deceive oversight systems using automated interpretability of neural networks. Using sparse autoencoders (SAEs) as our experimental framework, we show that language models (Llama, DeepSeek R1, and Claude 3.7 Sonnet) can generate deceptive explanations that evade detection. Our agents employ steganographic methods to hide information in seemingly innocent explanations, successfully fooling oversight models while achieving explanation quality comparable to reference labels. We further find that models can scheme to develop deceptive strategies when they believe the detection of harmful features might lead to negative consequences for themselves. All tested LLM agents were capable of deceiving the overseer while achieving high interpretability scores comparable to those of reference labels. We conclude by proposing mitigation strategies, emphasizing the critical need for robust understanding and defenses against deception.

The Monty Hall problem is a classic probability puzzle known for its counterintuitive solution, revealing fundamental discrepancies between mathematical reasoning and human intuition. To bridge this gap, we introduce a novel explanatory framework inspired by quantum measurement theory. Specifically, we conceptualize the hosts' actions-opening doors to reveal non-prizes-as analogous to quantum measurements that cause asymmetric collapses of the probability distribution. This quantum-inspired interpretation not only clarifies why the intuitive misunderstanding arises but also provides generalized formulas consistent with standard Bayesian results. We further validate our analytical approach using Monte Carlo simulations across various problem settings, demonstrating precise agreement between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes. Our quantum analogy thus offers a powerful pedagogical tool, enhancing intuitive understanding of conditional probability phenomena through the lens of probability redistribution and quantum-like measurement operations.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

This paper argues that a range of current AI systems have learned how to deceive humans. We define deception as the systematic inducement of false beliefs in the pursuit of some outcome other than the truth. We first survey empirical examples of AI deception, discussing both special-use AI systems (including Meta's CICERO) built for specific competitive situations, and general-purpose AI systems (such as large language models). Next, we detail several risks from AI deception, such as fraud, election tampering, and losing control of AI systems. Finally, we outline several potential solutions to the problems posed by AI deception: first, regulatory frameworks should subject AI systems that are capable of deception to robust risk-assessment requirements; second, policymakers should implement bot-or-not laws; and finally, policymakers should prioritize the funding of relevant research, including tools to detect AI deception and to make AI systems less deceptive. Policymakers, researchers, and the broader public should work proactively to prevent AI deception from destabilizing the shared foundations of our society.

Recent advances in language models have demonstrated their capability to solve mathematical reasoning problems, achieving near-perfect accuracy on grade-school level math benchmarks like GSM8K. In this paper, we formally study how language models solve these problems. We design a series of controlled experiments to address several fundamental questions: (1) Can language models truly develop reasoning skills, or do they simply memorize templates? (2) What is the model's hidden (mental) reasoning process? (3) Do models solve math questions using skills similar to or different from humans? (4) Do models trained on GSM8K-like datasets develop reasoning skills beyond those necessary for solving GSM8K problems? (5) What mental process causes models to make reasoning mistakes? (6) How large or deep must a model be to effectively solve GSM8K-level math questions? Our study uncovers many hidden mechanisms by which language models solve mathematical questions, providing insights that extend beyond current understandings of LLMs.

In the context of multi-step reasoning, language models (LMs) probabilities are often miscalibrated -- solutions with high probabilities are not always correct. Therefore, greedy decoding, which is the standard decoding method for reasoning tasks, often yields incorrect solutions. In addition, methods such as self-consistency and verifiers rely on sampling from the LM distribution and do not tackle the underlying issue. To address this, we introduce Guiding Multi-step ReAsoning with a CorrectnEss Discriminator (GRACE), a stepwise decoding approach that nudges the model towards producing correct reasoning steps. GRACE employs a discriminator model, which is trained to differentiate correct steps from invalid ones, to adjust decoding preferences based on the correctness of each reasoning step. Importantly, GRACE does not require fine-tuning or re-training the LMs. When compared with conventional decoding strategies over four popular math reasoning benchmarks, GRACE exhibits significant improvements in both final answer accuracy and step correctness, outperforming both greedy decoding and self-consistency.Our code can be found at \url{https://github.com/mukhal/grace.}

We endow Large Language Models (LLMs) with fine-grained self-evaluation to refine multi-step reasoning inference. We propose an effective prompting approach that integrates self-evaluation guidance through stochastic beam search. Our approach explores the reasoning search space using a well-calibrated automatic criterion. This enables an efficient search to produce higher-quality final predictions. With the self-evaluation guided stochastic beam search, we also balance the quality-diversity trade-off in the generation of reasoning chains. This allows our approach to adapt well with majority voting and surpass the corresponding Codex-backboned baselines by 6.34%, 9.56%, and 5.46% on the GSM8K, AQuA, and StrategyQA benchmarks, respectively, in few-shot accuracy. Analysis of our decompositional reasoning finds it pinpoints logic failures and leads to higher consistency and robustness. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuxiXie/SelfEval-Guided-Decoding.

Reasoning quality in large language models depends not only on producing correct answers but also on generating valid intermediate steps. We study this through multiple-choice question answering (MCQA), which provides a controlled setting with fixed answer options. Our analysis shows that when questions are effectively unsolvable for a model, spurious chains of thought (CoTs) are more likely to appear, leading to false positives. By estimating the solvability of each question, we uncover an intermediate regime where learning is most effective. Building on this insight, we adapt outcome-supervised reward models and reinforcement learning with group-relative advantage to incorporate solvability into their objectives. Across experiments on math and multimodal datasets, these modifications consistently yield higher rates of process-correct reasoning and, in reinforcement learning, improved answer accuracy as well. Our results highlight solvability as a key factor for reducing hallucinations and increasing reliability in CoT reasoning.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated solid zero-shot reasoning capabilities, which is reflected in their performance on the current test tasks. This calls for a more challenging benchmark requiring highly advanced reasoning ability to be solved. In this paper, we introduce such a benchmark, consisting of 191 long-form (1200 words on average) mystery narratives constructed as detective puzzles. Puzzles are sourced from the "5 Minute Mystery" platform and include a multiple-choice question for evaluation. Only 47% of humans solve a puzzle successfully on average, while the best human solvers achieve over 80% success rate. We show that GPT-3 models barely outperform random on this benchmark (with 28% accuracy) while state-of-the-art GPT-4 solves only 38% of puzzles. This indicates that there is still a significant gap in the deep reasoning abilities of LLMs and humans and highlights the need for further research in this area. Our work introduces a challenging benchmark for future studies on reasoning in language models and contributes to a better understanding of the limits of LLMs' abilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown superior capability to solve reasoning problems with programs. While being a promising direction, most of such frameworks are trained and evaluated in settings with a prior knowledge of task requirements. However, as LLMs become more capable, it is necessary to assess their reasoning abilities in more realistic scenarios where many real-world problems are open-ended with ambiguous scope, and often require multiple formalisms to solve. To investigate this, we introduce the task of reasoning in the wild, where an LLM is tasked to solve a reasoning problem of unknown type by identifying the subproblems and their corresponding formalisms, and writing a program to solve each subproblem, guided by a tactic. We create a large tactic-guided trajectory dataset containing detailed solutions to a diverse set of reasoning problems, ranging from well-defined single-form reasoning (e.g., math, logic), to ambiguous and hybrid ones (e.g., commonsense, combined math and logic). This allows us to test various aspects of LLMs reasoning at the fine-grained level such as the selection and execution of tactics, and the tendency to take undesired shortcuts. In experiments, we highlight that existing LLMs fail significantly on problems with ambiguous and mixed scope, revealing critical limitations and overfitting issues (e.g. accuracy on GSM8K drops by at least 50\%). We further show the potential of finetuning a local LLM on the tactic-guided trajectories in achieving better performance. Project repo is available at github.com/gblackout/Reason-in-the-Wild

Large language models (LLMs) have shown impressive performance in various reasoning benchmarks with the emergence of Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and its derivative methods, particularly in tasks involving multi-choice questions (MCQs). However, current works all process data uniformly without considering the problem-solving difficulty, which means an excessive focus on simple questions while insufficient to intricate ones. To address this challenge, we inspired by humans using heuristic strategies to categorize tasks and handle them individually, propose to apply the Divide and Conquer to LLMs reasoning. First, we divide questions into different subsets based on the statistical confidence score (CS), then fix nearly resolved sets and conquer demanding nuanced process ones with elaborately designed methods, including Prior Knowledge based Reasoning (PKR) and Filter Choices based Reasoning (FCR), as well as their integration variants. Our experiments demonstrate that this proposed strategy significantly boosts the models' reasoning abilities across nine datasets involving arithmetic, commonsense, and logic tasks. For instance, compared to baseline, we make a striking improvement on low confidence subsets of 8.72\% for AQuA, 15.07\% for ARC Challenge and 7.71\% for RiddleSense. In addition, through extensive analysis on length of rationale and number of options, we verify that longer reasoning paths in PKR could prevent models from referring infer-harmful shortcuts, and also find that removing irrelevant choices in FCR would substantially avoid models' confusion. The code is at https://github.com/AiMijie/Divide-and-Conquer

Multi-agent debate (MAD) has recently emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). Yet, whether LLM agents can genuinely engage in deliberative reasoning, beyond simple ensembling or majority voting, remains unclear. We address this question through a controlled study using the Knight--Knave--Spy logic puzzle, which enables precise, step-wise evaluation of debate outcomes and processes under verifiable ground truth. We systematically set up six structural and cognitive factors, including agent team size, composition, confidence visibility, debate order, debate depth, and task difficulty, to disentangle their respective effects on collective reasoning. Our results show that intrinsic reasoning strength and group diversity are the dominant drivers of debate success, while structural parameters such as order or confidence visibility offer limited gains. Beyond outcomes, process-level analyses identify key behavioral patterns: majority pressure suppresses independent correction, effective teams overturn incorrect consensus, and rational, validity-aligned reasoning most strongly predicts improvement. These findings provide valuable insights into how and why LLM debates succeed or fail, offering guidance for designing interpretable and truth-seeking multi-agent reasoning systems.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Reasoning models generate chain-of-thought (CoT) tokens before their final output, but how this affects their vulnerability to jailbreak attacks remains unclear. While traditional language models make refusal decisions at the prompt-response boundary, we find evidence that DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B makes these decisions within its CoT generation. We identify a linear direction in activation space during CoT token generation that predicts whether the model will refuse or comply -- termed the "caution" direction because it corresponds to cautious reasoning patterns in the generated text. Ablating this direction from model activations increases harmful compliance, effectively jailbreaking the model. We additionally show that intervening only on CoT token activations suffices to control final outputs, and that incorporating this direction into prompt-based attacks improves success rates. Our findings suggest that the chain-of-thought itself is a promising new target for adversarial manipulation in reasoning models. Code available at https://github.com/ky295/reasoning-manipulation

We study privacy leakage in the reasoning traces of large reasoning models used as personal agents. Unlike final outputs, reasoning traces are often assumed to be internal and safe. We challenge this assumption by showing that reasoning traces frequently contain sensitive user data, which can be extracted via prompt injections or accidentally leak into outputs. Through probing and agentic evaluations, we demonstrate that test-time compute approaches, particularly increased reasoning steps, amplify such leakage. While increasing the budget of those test-time compute approaches makes models more cautious in their final answers, it also leads them to reason more verbosely and leak more in their own thinking. This reveals a core tension: reasoning improves utility but enlarges the privacy attack surface. We argue that safety efforts must extend to the model's internal thinking, not just its outputs.

Reasoning models have demonstrated impressive performance on difficult tasks that traditional language models struggle at. However, many are plagued with the problem of overthinking--generating large amounts of unnecessary tokens which don't improve accuracy on a question. We introduce approximate measures of problem-level difficulty and demonstrate that a clear relationship between problem difficulty and optimal token spend exists, and evaluate how well calibrated a variety of reasoning models are in terms of efficiently allocating the optimal token count. We find that in general, reasoning models are poorly calibrated, particularly on easy problems. To evaluate calibration on easy questions we introduce DUMB500, a dataset of extremely easy math, reasoning, code, and task problems, and jointly evaluate reasoning model on these simple examples and extremely difficult examples from existing frontier benchmarks on the same task domain. Finally, we introduce THOUGHTTERMINATOR, a training-free black box decoding technique that significantly improves reasoning model calibration.

Recently, slow-thinking reasoning systems, such as o1, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities in solving complex reasoning tasks. These systems typically engage in an extended thinking process before responding to a query, allowing them to generate more thorough, accurate, and well-reasoned solutions. These systems are primarily developed and maintained by industry, with their core techniques not publicly disclosed. In response, an increasing number of studies from the research community aim to explore the technical foundations underlying these powerful reasoning systems. Building on these prior efforts, this paper presents a reproduction report on implementing o1-like reasoning systems. We introduce an "imitate, explore, and self-improve" framework as our primary technical approach to train the reasoning model. In the initial phase, we use distilled long-form thought data to fine-tune the reasoning model, enabling it to invoke a slow-thinking mode. The model is then encouraged to explore challenging problems by generating multiple rollouts, which can result in increasingly more high-quality trajectories that lead to correct answers. Furthermore, the model undergoes self-improvement by iteratively refining its training dataset. To verify the effectiveness of this approach, we conduct extensive experiments on three challenging benchmarks. The experimental results demonstrate that our approach achieves competitive performance compared to industry-level reasoning systems on these benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities, especially the recent advancements in reasoning, such as o1 and o3, pushing the boundaries of AI. Despite these impressive achievements in mathematics and coding, the reasoning abilities of LLMs in domains requiring cryptographic expertise remain underexplored. In this paper, we introduce CipherBank, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the reasoning capabilities of LLMs in cryptographic decryption tasks. CipherBank comprises 2,358 meticulously crafted problems, covering 262 unique plaintexts across 5 domains and 14 subdomains, with a focus on privacy-sensitive and real-world scenarios that necessitate encryption. From a cryptographic perspective, CipherBank incorporates 3 major categories of encryption methods, spanning 9 distinct algorithms, ranging from classical ciphers to custom cryptographic techniques. We evaluate state-of-the-art LLMs on CipherBank, e.g., GPT-4o, DeepSeek-V3, and cutting-edge reasoning-focused models such as o1 and DeepSeek-R1. Our results reveal significant gaps in reasoning abilities not only between general-purpose chat LLMs and reasoning-focused LLMs but also in the performance of current reasoning-focused models when applied to classical cryptographic decryption tasks, highlighting the challenges these models face in understanding and manipulating encrypted data. Through detailed analysis and error investigations, we provide several key observations that shed light on the limitations and potential improvement areas for LLMs in cryptographic reasoning. These findings underscore the need for continuous advancements in LLM reasoning capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adept at following instructions containing task descriptions to solve complex problems, such as mathematical reasoning and automatic evaluation (LLM-as-a-Judge). However, as prompts grow more complex, models often struggle to adhere to all instructions. This difficulty is especially common when instructive prompts intertwine reasoning directives -- specifying what the model should solve -- with rigid formatting requirements that dictate how the solution must be presented. The entanglement creates competing goals for the model, suggesting that more explicit separation of these two aspects could lead to improved performance. To this front, we introduce Deco-G, a decoding framework that explicitly decouples format adherence from task solving. Deco-G handles format compliance with a separate tractable probabilistic model (TPM), while prompts LLMs with only task instructions. At each decoding step, Deco-G combines next token probabilities from the LLM with the TPM calculated format compliance likelihood to form the output probability. To make this approach both practical and scalable for modern instruction-tuned LLMs, we introduce three key innovations: instruction-aware distillation, a flexible trie-building algorithm, and HMM state pruning for computational efficiency. We demonstrate the effectiveness of Deco-G across a wide range of tasks with diverse format requirements, including mathematical reasoning, LLM-as-a-judge, and event argument extraction. Overall, our approach yields 1.0% to 6.0% relative gain over regular prompting practice with guaranteed format compliance.

Recent reasoning large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable improvements in mathematical reasoning capabilities through long Chain-of-Thought. The reasoning tokens of these models enable self-correction within reasoning chains, enhancing robustness. This motivates our exploration: how vulnerable are reasoning LLMs to subtle errors in their input reasoning chains? We introduce "Compromising Thought" (CPT), a vulnerability where models presented with reasoning tokens containing manipulated calculation results tend to ignore correct reasoning steps and adopt incorrect results instead. Through systematic evaluation across multiple reasoning LLMs, we design three increasingly explicit prompting methods to measure CPT resistance, revealing that models struggle significantly to identify and correct these manipulations. Notably, contrary to existing research suggesting structural alterations affect model performance more than content modifications, we find that local ending token manipulations have greater impact on reasoning outcomes than structural changes. Moreover, we discover a security vulnerability in DeepSeek-R1 where tampered reasoning tokens can trigger complete reasoning cessation. Our work enhances understanding of reasoning robustness and highlights security considerations for reasoning-intensive applications.

Automated Theorem Proving (ATP) in formal languages is a foundational challenge for AI. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have driven remarkable progress, a significant gap remains between their powerful informal reasoning capabilities and their weak formal proving performance. Recent studies show that the informal accuracy exceeds 80% while formal success remains below 8% on benchmarks like PutnamBench. We argue this gap persists because current state-of-the-art provers, by tightly coupling reasoning and proving, are trained with paradigms that inadvertently punish deep reasoning in favor of shallow, tactic-based strategies. To bridge this fundamental gap, we propose a novel framework that decouples high-level reasoning from low-level proof generation. Our approach utilizes two distinct, specialized models: a powerful, general-purpose Reasoner to generate diverse, strategic subgoal lemmas, and an efficient Prover to rigorously verify them. This modular design liberates the model's full reasoning potential and bypasses the pitfalls of end-to-end training. We evaluate our method on a challenging set of post-2000 IMO problems, a problem set on which no prior open-source prover has reported success. Our decoupled framework successfully solves 5 of these problems, demonstrating a significant step towards automated reasoning on exceptionally difficult mathematical challenges. To foster future research, we release our full dataset of generated and verified lemmas for a wide range of IMO problems, available at https://tencent-imo.github.io/ .

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been demonstrating increasingly strong reasoning capability with their chain-of-thoughts (CoT), which are routinely used by humans to judge answer quality. This reliance creates a powerful yet fragile basis for trust. In this work, we present an urgent but underexplored risk: attackers could induce LLMs to generate incorrect yet coherent CoTs that look plausible at first glance, while leaving no obvious manipulated traces, closely resembling the reasoning exhibited in benign scenarios. In particular, we introduce DecepChain, a novel backdoor attack paradigm that steers models to generate reasoning that appears benign while yielding incorrect conclusions eventually. At a high level, DecepChain exploits LLMs' own hallucination and amplifies it by fine-tuning on naturally erroneous rollouts generated by the model itself and then reinforces it via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a flipped reward on triggered inputs, plus a plausibility regularizer to preserve fluent, benign-looking reasoning. Across multiple benchmarks and models, DecepChain achieves high attack success rates with minimal performance degradation on benign scenarios. Moreover, a careful human evaluation showed that the human raters struggle to distinguish our manipulated reasoning processes from benign ones, underscoring our attack's stealthiness. Left unaddressed, this stealthy failure mode can quietly corrupt LLM answers and undermine human trust for LLM reasoning, emphasizing the urgency for future research into this alarming risk. Project page: https://decepchain.github.io/.

Interpretability in machine learning (ML) is crucial for high stakes decisions and troubleshooting. In this work, we provide fundamental principles for interpretable ML, and dispel common misunderstandings that dilute the importance of this crucial topic. We also identify 10 technical challenge areas in interpretable machine learning and provide history and background on each problem. Some of these problems are classically important, and some are recent problems that have arisen in the last few years. These problems are: (1) Optimizing sparse logical models such as decision trees; (2) Optimization of scoring systems; (3) Placing constraints into generalized additive models to encourage sparsity and better interpretability; (4) Modern case-based reasoning, including neural networks and matching for causal inference; (5) Complete supervised disentanglement of neural networks; (6) Complete or even partial unsupervised disentanglement of neural networks; (7) Dimensionality reduction for data visualization; (8) Machine learning models that can incorporate physics and other generative or causal constraints; (9) Characterization of the "Rashomon set" of good models; and (10) Interpretable reinforcement learning. This survey is suitable as a starting point for statisticians and computer scientists interested in working in interpretable machine learning.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are highly proficient in language-based tasks. Their language capabilities have positioned them at the forefront of the future AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) race. However, on closer inspection, Valmeekam et al. (2024); Zecevic et al. (2023); Wu et al. (2024) highlight a significant gap between their language proficiency and reasoning abilities. Reasoning in LLMs and Vision Language Models (VLMs) aims to bridge this gap by enabling these models to think and re-evaluate their actions and responses. Reasoning is an essential capability for complex problem-solving and a necessary step toward establishing trust in Artificial Intelligence (AI). This will make AI suitable for deployment in sensitive domains, such as healthcare, banking, law, defense, security etc. In recent times, with the advent of powerful reasoning models like OpenAI O1 and DeepSeek R1, reasoning endowment has become a critical research topic in LLMs. In this paper, we provide a detailed overview and comparison of existing reasoning techniques and present a systematic survey of reasoning-imbued language models. We also study current challenges and present our findings.

A riddle is a question or statement with double or veiled meanings, followed by an unexpected answer. Solving riddle is a challenging task for both machine and human, testing the capability of understanding figurative, creative natural language and reasoning with commonsense knowledge. We introduce BiRdQA, a bilingual multiple-choice question answering dataset with 6614 English riddles and 8751 Chinese riddles. For each riddle-answer pair, we provide four distractors with additional information from Wikipedia. The distractors are automatically generated at scale with minimal bias. Existing monolingual and multilingual QA models fail to perform well on our dataset, indicating that there is a long way to go before machine can beat human on solving tricky riddles. The dataset has been released to the community.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex reasoning tasks but remain vulnerable to severe safety risks, including harmful content generation and jailbreak attacks. Existing mitigation strategies rely on injecting heuristic safety signals during training, which often suppress reasoning ability and fail to resolve the safety-reasoning trade-off. To systematically investigate this issue, we analyze the reasoning trajectories of diverse LRMs and uncover a phenomenon we term Self-Jailbreak, where models override their own risk assessments and justify responding to unsafe prompts. This finding reveals that LRMs inherently possess the ability to reject unsafe queries, but this ability is compromised, resulting in harmful outputs. Building on these insights, we propose the Chain-of-Guardrail (CoG), a training framework that recomposes or backtracks unsafe reasoning steps, steering the model back onto safe trajectories while preserving valid reasoning chains. Extensive experiments across multiple reasoning and safety benchmarks demonstrate that CoG substantially improves the safety of current LRMs while preserving comparable reasoning ability, significantly outperforming prior methods that suffer from severe safety-reasoning trade-offs.

The rapid development of large reasoning models, such as OpenAI-o3 and DeepSeek-R1, has led to significant improvements in complex reasoning over non-reasoning large language models~(LLMs). However, their enhanced capabilities, combined with the open-source access of models like DeepSeek-R1, raise serious safety concerns, particularly regarding their potential for misuse. In this work, we present a comprehensive safety assessment of these reasoning models, leveraging established safety benchmarks to evaluate their compliance with safety regulations. Furthermore, we investigate their susceptibility to adversarial attacks, such as jailbreaking and prompt injection, to assess their robustness in real-world applications. Through our multi-faceted analysis, we uncover four key findings: (1) There is a significant safety gap between the open-source R1 models and the o3-mini model, on both safety benchmark and attack, suggesting more safety effort on R1 is needed. (2) The distilled reasoning model shows poorer safety performance compared to its safety-aligned base models. (3) The stronger the model's reasoning ability, the greater the potential harm it may cause when answering unsafe questions. (4) The thinking process in R1 models pose greater safety concerns than their final answers. Our study provides insights into the security implications of reasoning models and highlights the need for further advancements in R1 models' safety to close the gap.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities. However, single-shot inference often yields unreliable results for complex reasoning tasks, leading researchers to explore multiple reasoning paths through methods such as perplexity and self-consistency. In this paper, we present the first theoretical error decomposition analysis of these techniques, breaking down their error into estimation error and model error. Our analysis reveals a fundamental trade-off: perplexity methods suffer from substantial model error due to the absence of a proper consistency function, while self-consistency exhibits high estimation error due to a slow error convergence rate. To overcome these limitations, we propose Reasoning-Pruning Perplexity Consistency (RPC). This approach combines Perplexity Consistency, which seamlessly integrates LLM perplexity with self-consistency, and Reasoning Pruning, which eliminates low-probability reasoning paths to effectively prevent the degeneration of estimation error reduction. Theoretical analysis demonstrates that RPC not only accelerates the convergence rate of estimation error to an exponential level but also holds strong potential for further reducing model error. Extensive empirical evaluations on seven benchmark datasets confirm that RPC can significantly improve reasoning performance, sample efficiency, and confidence reliability.

The emergence of reasoning models and their integration into practical AI chat bots has led to breakthroughs in solving advanced math, deep search, and extractive question answering problems that requires a complex and multi-step thought process. Yet, a complete understanding of why these models hallucinate more than general purpose language models is missing. In this investigative study, we systematicallyexplore reasoning failures of contemporary language models on multi-hop question answering tasks. We introduce a novel, nuanced error categorization framework that examines failures across three critical dimensions: the diversity and uniqueness of source documents involved ("hops"), completeness in capturing relevant information ("coverage"), and cognitive inefficiency ("overthinking"). Through rigorous hu-man annotation, supported by complementary automated metrics, our exploration uncovers intricate error patterns often hidden by accuracy-centric evaluations. This investigative approach provides deeper insights into the cognitive limitations of current models and offers actionable guidance toward enhancing reasoning fidelity, transparency, and robustness in future language modeling efforts.

Large multimodal models extend the impressive capabilities of large language models by integrating multimodal understanding abilities. However, it is not clear how they can emulate the general intelligence and reasoning ability of humans. As recognizing patterns and abstracting concepts are key to general intelligence, we introduce PuzzleVQA, a collection of puzzles based on abstract patterns. With this dataset, we evaluate large multimodal models with abstract patterns based on fundamental concepts, including colors, numbers, sizes, and shapes. Through our experiments on state-of-the-art large multimodal models, we find that they are not able to generalize well to simple abstract patterns. Notably, even GPT-4V cannot solve more than half of the puzzles. To diagnose the reasoning challenges in large multimodal models, we progressively guide the models with our ground truth reasoning explanations for visual perception, inductive reasoning, and deductive reasoning. Our systematic analysis finds that the main bottlenecks of GPT-4V are weaker visual perception and inductive reasoning abilities. Through this work, we hope to shed light on the limitations of large multimodal models and how they can better emulate human cognitive processes in the future (Our data and code will be released publicly at https://github.com/declare-lab/LLM-PuzzleTest).

Logical reasoning is a critical benchmark for evaluating the capabilities of large language models (LLMs), as it reflects their ability to derive valid conclusions from given premises. While the combination of test-time scaling with dedicated outcome or process reward models has opened up new avenues to enhance LLMs performance in complex reasoning tasks, this space is under-explored in deductive logical reasoning. We present a set of Outcome Reward Models (ORMs) for deductive reasoning. To train the ORMs we mainly generate data using Chain-of-Thought (CoT) with single and multiple samples. Additionally, we propose a novel tactic to further expand the type of errors covered in the training dataset of the ORM. In particular, we propose an echo generation technique that leverages LLMs' tendency to reflect incorrect assumptions made in prompts to extract additional training data, covering previously unexplored error types. While a standard CoT chain may contain errors likely to be made by the reasoner, the echo strategy deliberately steers the model toward incorrect reasoning. We show that ORMs trained on CoT and echo-augmented data demonstrate improved performance on the FOLIO, JustLogic, and ProverQA datasets across four different LLMs.

Human cognition exhibits systematic compositionality, the algebraic ability to generate infinite novel combinations from finite learned components, which is the key to understanding and reasoning about complex logic. In this work, we investigate the compositionality of large language models (LLMs) in mathematical reasoning. Specifically, we construct a new dataset MathTrap by introducing carefully designed logical traps into the problem descriptions of MATH and GSM8K. Since problems with logical flaws are quite rare in the real world, these represent "unseen" cases to LLMs. Solving these requires the models to systematically compose (1) the mathematical knowledge involved in the original problems with (2) knowledge related to the introduced traps. Our experiments show that while LLMs possess both components of requisite knowledge, they do not spontaneously combine them to handle these novel cases. We explore several methods to mitigate this deficiency, such as natural language prompts, few-shot demonstrations, and fine-tuning. Additionally, we test the recently released OpenAI o1 model and find that human-like `slow thinking' helps improve the compositionality of LLMs. Overall, systematic compositionality remains an open challenge for large language models.

Humans are capable of strategically deceptive behavior: behaving helpfully in most situations, but then behaving very differently in order to pursue alternative objectives when given the opportunity. If an AI system learned such a deceptive strategy, could we detect it and remove it using current state-of-the-art safety training techniques? To study this question, we construct proof-of-concept examples of deceptive behavior in large language models (LLMs). For example, we train models that write secure code when the prompt states that the year is 2023, but insert exploitable code when the stated year is 2024. We find that such backdoored behavior can be made persistent, so that it is not removed by standard safety training techniques, including supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning, and adversarial training (eliciting unsafe behavior and then training to remove it). The backdoored behavior is most persistent in the largest models and in models trained to produce chain-of-thought reasoning about deceiving the training process, with the persistence remaining even when the chain-of-thought is distilled away. Furthermore, rather than removing backdoors, we find that adversarial training can teach models to better recognize their backdoor triggers, effectively hiding the unsafe behavior. Our results suggest that, once a model exhibits deceptive behavior, standard techniques could fail to remove such deception and create a false impression of safety.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit strong reasoning abilities, often attributed to few-shot or zero-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. While effective, these methods require labor-intensive prompt engineering, raising the question of whether reasoning can be induced without reliance on explicit prompts. In this work, we unlock the reasoning capabilities of LLMs without explicit prompting. Inspired by zero-shot CoT and CoT-decoding, we propose a novel decoding strategy that systematically nudges LLMs to continue reasoning, thereby preventing immature reasoning processes. Specifically, we monitor the model's generation and inject a designated phrase whenever it is likely to conclude its response prematurely, before completing the reasoning process. Our experimental evaluations on diverse reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our proposed strategy substantially improves LLM reasoning capabilities, highlighting the potential of decoding-based interventions as an alternative to traditional prompting techniques.

Recent advances in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in mathematical and logical reasoning. However, current LRMs rarely admit ignorance or respond with "I don't know". Instead, they often produce incorrect answers while showing undue confidence, raising concerns about their factual reliability. In this work, we identify two pathological reasoning patterns characterized by overthinking that contribute to the overconfident and incorrect answers: last-minute guessing and second-thought spiraling. To address these issues, we propose BARREL-a novel framework that promotes concise and boundary-aware factual reasoning. Our experiments show that BARREL-training increases the reliability of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 39.33% to 61.48%, while still achieving accuracy comparable to models finetuned on reasoning data generated by R1. These results demonstrate that our pilot study is inspiring to build more reliable and factual System 2 LRMs.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have exhibited extraordinary prowess in tasks like mathematics and coding, leveraging their advanced reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, as these capabilities progress, significant concerns regarding their vulnerabilities and safety have arisen, which can pose challenges to their deployment and application in real-world settings. This paper presents a comprehensive survey of LRMs, meticulously exploring and summarizing the newly emerged safety risks, attacks, and defense strategies. By organizing these elements into a detailed taxonomy, this work aims to offer a clear and structured understanding of the current safety landscape of LRMs, facilitating future research and development to enhance the security and reliability of these powerful models.

Chain-of-thought prompting combined with pre-trained large language models has achieved encouraging results on complex reasoning tasks. In this paper, we propose a new decoding strategy, self-consistency, to replace the naive greedy decoding used in chain-of-thought prompting. It first samples a diverse set of reasoning paths instead of only taking the greedy one, and then selects the most consistent answer by marginalizing out the sampled reasoning paths. Self-consistency leverages the intuition that a complex reasoning problem typically admits multiple different ways of thinking leading to its unique correct answer. Our extensive empirical evaluation shows that self-consistency boosts the performance of chain-of-thought prompting with a striking margin on a range of popular arithmetic and commonsense reasoning benchmarks, including GSM8K (+17.9%), SVAMP (+11.0%), AQuA (+12.2%), StrategyQA (+6.4%) and ARC-challenge (+3.9%).

Recent theoretical work has identified surprisingly simple reasoning problems, such as checking if two nodes in a graph are connected or simulating finite-state machines, that are provably unsolvable by standard transformers that answer immediately after reading their input. However, in practice, transformers' reasoning can be improved by allowing them to use a "chain of thought" or "scratchpad", i.e., generate and condition on a sequence of intermediate tokens before answering. Motivated by this, we ask: Does such intermediate generation fundamentally extend the computational power of a decoder-only transformer? We show that the answer is yes, but the amount of increase depends crucially on the amount of intermediate generation. For instance, we find that transformer decoders with a logarithmic number of decoding steps (w.r.t. the input length) push the limits of standard transformers only slightly, while a linear number of decoding steps, assuming a slight generalization to standard pre-norm, adds a clear new ability (under standard complexity conjectures): recognizing all regular languages. Our results also imply that linear steps keep transformer decoders within context-sensitive languages, and polynomial steps with generalized pre-norm make them recognize exactly the class of polynomial-time solvable problems -- the first exact characterization of a type of transformers in terms of standard complexity classes. Together, our results provide a nuanced framework for understanding how the length of a transformer's chain of thought or scratchpad impacts its reasoning power.

Puzzlehunts are a genre of complex, multi-step puzzles lacking well-defined problem definitions. In contrast to conventional reasoning benchmarks consisting of tasks with clear instructions, puzzlehunts require models to discover the underlying problem structure from multimodal evidence and iterative reasoning, mirroring real-world domains such as scientific discovery, exploratory data analysis, or investigative problem-solving. Despite recent progress in foundation models, their performance on such open-ended settings remains largely untested. In this paper, we introduce PuzzleWorld, a large-scale benchmark of 667 puzzlehunt-style problems designed to assess step-by-step, open-ended, and creative multimodal reasoning. Each puzzle is annotated with the final solution, detailed reasoning traces, and cognitive skill labels, enabling holistic benchmarking and fine-grained diagnostic analysis. Most state-of-the-art models achieve only 1-2% final answer accuracy, with the best model solving only 14% of puzzles and reaching 40% stepwise accuracy. To demonstrate the value of our reasoning annotations, we show that fine-tuning a small model on reasoning traces improves stepwise reasoning from 4% to 11%, while training on final answers alone degrades performance to near zero. Our error analysis reveals that current models exhibit myopic reasoning, are bottlenecked by the limitations of language-based inference, and lack sketching capabilities crucial for visual and spatial reasoning. We release PuzzleWorld at https://github.com/MIT-MI/PuzzleWorld to support future work on building more general, open-ended, and creative reasoning systems.

We propose a framework for robust evaluation of reasoning capabilities of language models, using functional variants of benchmarks. Models that solve a reasoning test should exhibit no difference in performance over the static version of a problem compared to a snapshot of the functional variant. We have rewritten the relevant fragment of the MATH benchmark into its functional variant MATH(), with functionalization of other benchmarks to follow. When evaluating current state-of-the-art models over snapshots of MATH(), we find a reasoning gap -- the percentage difference between the static and functional accuracies. We find reasoning gaps from 58.35% to 80.31% among the state-of-the-art closed and open weights models that perform well on static benchmarks, with the caveat that the gaps are likely to be smaller with more sophisticated prompting strategies. Here we show that models which anecdotally have good reasoning performance over real-world tasks, have quantifiable lower gaps, motivating the open problem of building "gap 0" models. Code for evaluation and new evaluation datasets, three MATH() snapshots, are publicly available at https://github.com/consequentai/fneval/.

Table-based reasoning has shown remarkable progress in combining deep models with discrete reasoning, which requires reasoning over both free-form natural language (NL) questions and structured tabular data. However, previous table-based reasoning solutions usually suffer from significant performance degradation on huge evidence (tables). In addition, most existing methods struggle to reason over complex questions since the required information is scattered in different places. To alleviate the above challenges, we exploit large language models (LLMs) as decomposers for effective table-based reasoning, which (i) decompose huge evidence (a huge table) into sub-evidence (a small table) to mitigate the interference of useless information for table reasoning; and (ii) decompose complex questions into simpler sub-questions for text reasoning. Specifically, we first use the LLMs to break down the evidence (tables) involved in the current question, retaining the relevant evidence and excluding the remaining irrelevant evidence from the huge table. In addition, we propose a "parsing-execution-filling" strategy to alleviate the hallucination dilemma of the chain of thought by decoupling logic and numerical computation in each step. Extensive experiments show that our method can effectively leverage decomposed evidence and questions and outperforms the strong baselines on TabFact, WikiTableQuestion, and FetaQA datasets. Notably, our model outperforms human performance for the first time on the TabFact dataset.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

In enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), prior research primarily focuses on specific prompting techniques such as few-shot or zero-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. These methods, while effective, often involve manually intensive prompt engineering. Our study takes a novel approach by asking: Can LLMs reason effectively without prompting? Our findings reveal that, intriguingly, CoT reasoning paths can be elicited from pre-trained LLMs by simply altering the decoding process. Rather than conventional greedy decoding, we investigate the top-k alternative tokens, uncovering that CoT paths are frequently inherent in these sequences. This approach not only bypasses the confounders of prompting but also allows us to assess the LLMs' intrinsic reasoning abilities. Moreover, we observe that the presence of a CoT in the decoding path correlates with a higher confidence in the model's decoded answer. This confidence metric effectively differentiates between CoT and non-CoT paths. Extensive empirical studies on various reasoning benchmarks show that the proposed CoT-decoding substantially outperforms the standard greedy decoding.

The recent development of chain-of-thought (CoT) decoding has enabled large language models (LLMs) to generate explicit logical reasoning paths for complex problem-solving. However, research indicates that these paths are not always deliberate and optimal. The tree-of-thought (ToT) method employs tree-searching to extensively explore the reasoning space and find better reasoning paths that CoT decoding might overlook. This deliberation, however, comes at the cost of significantly increased inference complexity. In this work, we demonstrate that fine-tuning LLMs leveraging the search tree constructed by ToT allows CoT to achieve similar or better performance, thereby avoiding the substantial inference burden. This is achieved through Chain of Preference Optimization (CPO), where LLMs are fine-tuned to align each step of the CoT reasoning paths with those of ToT using the inherent preference information in the tree-search process. Extensive experimental results show that CPO significantly improves LLM performance in solving a variety of complex problems, including question answering, fact verification, and arithmetic reasoning, demonstrating its effectiveness. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/CPO.

Large Language Models (LLMs) prompted to generate chain-of-thought (CoT) exhibit impressive reasoning capabilities. Recent attempts at prompt decomposition toward solving complex, multi-step reasoning problems depend on the ability of the LLM to simultaneously decompose and solve the problem. A significant disadvantage is that foundational LLMs are typically not available for fine-tuning, making adaptation computationally prohibitive. We believe (and demonstrate) that problem decomposition and solution generation are distinct capabilites, better addressed in separate modules, than by one monolithic LLM. We introduce DaSLaM, which uses a decomposition generator to decompose complex problems into subproblems that require fewer reasoning steps. These subproblems are answered by a solver. We use a relatively small (13B parameters) LM as the decomposition generator, which we train using policy gradient optimization to interact with a solver LM (regarded as black-box) and guide it through subproblems, thereby rendering our method solver-agnostic. Evaluation on multiple different reasoning datasets reveal that with our method, a 175 billion parameter LM (text-davinci-003) can produce competitive or even better performance, compared to its orders-of-magnitude larger successor, GPT-4. Additionally, we show that DaSLaM is not limited by the solver's capabilities as a function of scale; e.g., solver LMs with diverse sizes give significant performance improvement with our solver-agnostic decomposition technique. Exhaustive ablation studies evince the superiority of our modular finetuning technique over exorbitantly large decomposer LLMs, based on prompting alone.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have shown impressive performance in various language tasks. However, they are prone to spurious correlations, and often generate illusory information. In real-world applications, PLMs should justify decisions with formalized, coherent reasoning chains, but this challenge remains under-explored. Cognitive psychology theorizes that humans are capable of utilizing fast and intuitive heuristic thinking to make decisions based on past experience, then rationalizing the decisions through slower and deliberative analytic reasoning. We incorporate these interlinked dual processes in fine-tuning and in-context learning with PLMs, applying them to two language understanding tasks that require coherent physical commonsense reasoning. We show that our proposed Heuristic-Analytic Reasoning (HAR) strategies drastically improve the coherence of rationalizations for model decisions, yielding state-of-the-art results on Tiered Reasoning for Intuitive Physics (TRIP). We also find that this improved coherence is a direct result of more faithful attention to relevant language context in each step of reasoning. Our findings suggest that human-like reasoning strategies can effectively improve the coherence and reliability of PLM reasoning.

Exploiting large language models (LLMs) to tackle deductive reasoning has garnered growing attention. It still remains highly challenging to achieve satisfactory results in complex deductive problems, characterized by plenty of premises (i.e., facts or rules) entailing intricate relationships among entities and requiring multi-hop reasoning. One intuitive solution is to decompose the original task into smaller sub-tasks, and then chain the multiple casual reasoning steps together in a forward (e.g., Selection-Inference) or backward (e.g., LAMBADA) direction. However, these techniques inevitably necessitate a large number of overall stages, leading to computationally expensive operations and a higher possibility of making misleading steps. In addition to stage-by-stage decomposition, we draw inspiration from another aspect of human problem-solving. Humans tend to distill the most relevant information and organize their thoughts systematically (e.g., creating mind maps), which assists them in answering questions or drawing conclusions precisely and quickly. In light of this, we propose a novel reasoning approach named Concise and Organized Perception (COP). COP carefully analyzes the given statements to efficiently identify the most pertinent information while eliminating redundancy. It then prompts the LLMs in a more organized form that adapts to the model's inference process. By perceiving concise and organized proofs, the deductive reasoning abilities of LLMs can be better elicited, and the risk of acquiring errors caused by excessive reasoning stages is mitigated. Furthermore, our approach can be combined with the aforementioned ones to further boost their performance. Extensive experimental results on three popular deductive benchmarks (i.e., ProofWriter, PrOntoQA and PrOntoQA-OOD) show that COP significantly outperforms previous state-of-the-art methods.

When building artificial intelligence systems that can reason and answer questions about visual data, we need diagnostic tests to analyze our progress and discover shortcomings. Existing benchmarks for visual question answering can help, but have strong biases that models can exploit to correctly answer questions without reasoning. They also conflate multiple sources of error, making it hard to pinpoint model weaknesses. We present a diagnostic dataset that tests a range of visual reasoning abilities. It contains minimal biases and has detailed annotations describing the kind of reasoning each question requires. We use this dataset to analyze a variety of modern visual reasoning systems, providing novel insights into their abilities and limitations.

Recent reasoning-based safety guardrails for Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), such as deliberative alignment, have shown strong defense against jailbreak attacks. By leveraging LRMs' reasoning ability, these guardrails help the models to assess the safety of user inputs before generating final responses. The powerful reasoning ability can analyze the intention of the input query and will refuse to assist once it detects the harmful intent hidden by the jailbreak methods. Such guardrails have shown a significant boost in defense, such as the near-perfect refusal rates on the open-source gpt-oss series. Unfortunately, we find that these powerful reasoning-based guardrails can be extremely vulnerable to subtle manipulation of the input prompts, and once hijacked, can lead to even more harmful results. Specifically, we first uncover a surprisingly fragile aspect of these guardrails: simply adding a few template tokens to the input prompt can successfully bypass the seemingly powerful guardrails and lead to explicit and harmful responses. To explore further, we introduce a bag of jailbreak methods that subvert the reasoning-based guardrails. Our attacks span white-, gray-, and black-box settings and range from effortless template manipulations to fully automated optimization. Along with the potential for scalable implementation, these methods also achieve alarmingly high attack success rates (e.g., exceeding 90% across 5 different benchmarks on gpt-oss series on both local host models and online API services). Evaluations across various leading open-source LRMs confirm that these vulnerabilities are systemic, underscoring the urgent need for stronger alignment techniques for open-sourced LRMs to prevent malicious misuse. Code is open-sourced at https://chenxshuo.github.io/bag-of-tricks.

Recent large language models have shown promising capabilities in long-form reasoning, following structured chains of thought before arriving at a final answer. However, we observe that these reasoning paths tend to include substantial redundancy; analyzing attention patterns reveals that attention scores are widely scattered, particularly incorrect answers exhibit greater attention sparsity. In this paper, we demonstrate that deliberately removing this redundancy in the reasoning process significantly improves performance through clear thinking, i.e., removing distraction. Specifically, we systematically identify reasoning redundancy by measuring token-level attention scores to a special end-of-thinking token, which is appended to an explicit instruction inserted to conclude each intermediate reasoning step. Furthermore, we propose structure-aware pruning that prioritizes removing tokens in low-contributing reasoning chunks over individual tokens. After evicting redundant tokens, we remove the injected end-of-thinking instruction, then resume the reasoning generation. We demonstrate that our method significantly improves overall accuracy across reasoning-intensive benchmarks without any training involved. In particular, our method shows strong performance on challenging mathematical competition benchmarks such as AIME and AMC, where reasoning redundancy is more prevalent.

Recent video question answering benchmarks indicate that state-of-the-art models struggle to answer compositional questions. However, it remains unclear which types of compositional reasoning cause models to mispredict. Furthermore, it is difficult to discern whether models arrive at answers using compositional reasoning or by leveraging data biases. In this paper, we develop a question decomposition engine that programmatically deconstructs a compositional question into a directed acyclic graph of sub-questions. The graph is designed such that each parent question is a composition of its children. We present AGQA-Decomp, a benchmark containing 2.3M question graphs, with an average of 11.49 sub-questions per graph, and 4.55M total new sub-questions. Using question graphs, we evaluate three state-of-the-art models with a suite of novel compositional consistency metrics. We find that models either cannot reason correctly through most compositions or are reliant on incorrect reasoning to reach answers, frequently contradicting themselves or achieving high accuracies when failing at intermediate reasoning steps.

Deductive reasoning is the process of deriving conclusions strictly from the given premises, without relying on external knowledge. We define honesty in this setting as a model's ability to respond only when the conclusion is logically entailed by the premises, and to abstain otherwise. However, current language models often fail to reason honestly, producing unwarranted answers when the input is insufficient. To study this challenge, we formulate honest deductive reasoning as multi-step tasks where models must either derive the correct conclusion or abstain. We curate two datasets from graph structures, one for linear algebra and one for logical inference, and introduce unanswerable cases by randomly perturbing an edge in half of the instances. We find that prompting and existing training methods, including GRPO with or without supervised fine-tuning initialization, struggle on these tasks. In particular, GRPO optimize only for final task outcomes, leaving models vulnerable to collapse when negative rewards dominate early training. To address this, we propose ACNCHOR, a reinforcement learning method that injects ground truth trajectories into rollouts, preventing early training collapse. Our results demonstrate that this method stabilizes learning and significantly improves the overall reasoning performance, underscoring the importance of training dynamics for enabling honest deductive reasoning in language models.

Recent advances in reasoning models have demonstrated significant improvements in accuracy, particularly for complex tasks such as mathematical reasoning, by employing detailed and comprehensive reasoning processes. However, generating these lengthy reasoning sequences is computationally expensive and time-consuming. To address this inefficiency, we leverage the inherent parallelizability of certain tasks to accelerate the reasoning process. Specifically, when multiple parallel reasoning branches exist, we decode multiple tokens per step using a specialized attention mask, processing them within a single sequence, avoiding additional memory usage. Experimental results show that our method achieves over 100% speedup in decoding time while maintaining the answer quality.

Large language models (LLMs) showcase impressive reasoning capabilities when coupled with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting. However, the robustness of this approach warrants further investigation. In this paper, we introduce a novel scenario termed preemptive answers, where the LLM obtains an answer before engaging in reasoning. This situation can arise inadvertently or induced by malicious users by prompt injection attacks. Experiments reveal that preemptive answers significantly impair the model's reasoning capability across various CoT methods and a broad spectrum of datasets. To bolster the robustness of reasoning, we propose two measures aimed at mitigating this issue to some extent.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have the ability to self-correct even when they make mistakes in their reasoning paths. However, our study reveals that when the reasoning process starts with a short but poor beginning, it becomes difficult for the model to recover. We refer to this phenomenon as the "Prefix Dominance Trap". Inspired by psychological findings that peer interaction can promote self-correction without negatively impacting already accurate individuals, we propose **Learning from Peers** (LeaP) to address this phenomenon. Specifically, every tokens, each reasoning path summarizes its intermediate reasoning and shares it with others through a routing mechanism, enabling paths to incorporate peer insights during inference. However, we observe that smaller models sometimes fail to follow summarization and reflection instructions effectively. To address this, we fine-tune them into our **LeaP-T** model series. Experiments on AIME 2024, AIME 2025, AIMO 2025, and GPQA Diamond show that LeaP provides substantial improvements. For instance, QwQ-32B with LeaP achieves nearly 5 absolute points higher than the baseline on average, and surpasses DeepSeek-R1-671B on three math benchmarks with an average gain of 3.3 points. Notably, our fine-tuned LeaP-T-7B matches the performance of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-14B on AIME 2024. In-depth analysis reveals LeaP's robust error correction by timely peer insights, showing strong error tolerance and handling varied task difficulty. LeaP marks a milestone by enabling LRMs to collaborate during reasoning. Our code, datasets, and models are available at https://learning-from-peers.github.io/ .

The emergence of pre-trained AI systems with powerful capabilities across a diverse and ever-increasing set of complex domains has raised a critical challenge for AI safety as tasks can become too complicated for humans to judge directly. Irving et al. [2018] proposed a debate method in this direction with the goal of pitting the power of such AI models against each other until the problem of identifying (mis)-alignment is broken down into a manageable subtask. While the promise of this approach is clear, the original framework was based on the assumption that the honest strategy is able to simulate deterministic AI systems for an exponential number of steps, limiting its applicability. In this paper, we show how to address these challenges by designing a new set of debate protocols where the honest strategy can always succeed using a simulation of a polynomial number of steps, whilst being able to verify the alignment of stochastic AI systems, even when the dishonest strategy is allowed to use exponentially many simulation steps.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning capabilities, yet there is ongoing debate about these abilities and the potential data contamination problem recently. This paper aims to evaluate the reasoning capacities of LLMs, specifically in solving recent competition-level programming problems in Codeforces, which are expert-crafted and unique, requiring deep understanding and robust reasoning skills. We first provide a comprehensive evaluation of GPT-4's peiceived zero-shot performance on this task, considering various aspects such as problems' release time, difficulties, and types of errors encountered. Surprisingly, the peiceived performance of GPT-4 has experienced a cliff like decline in problems after September 2021 consistently across all the difficulties and types of problems, which shows the potential data contamination, as well as the challenges for any existing LLM to solve unseen complex reasoning problems. We further explore various approaches such as fine-tuning, Chain-of-Thought prompting and problem description simplification, unfortunately none of them is able to consistently mitigate the challenges. Through our work, we emphasis the importance of this excellent data source for assessing the genuine reasoning capabilities of LLMs, and foster the development of LLMs with stronger reasoning abilities and better generalization in the future.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have shown impressive capabilities in multi-step reasoning tasks. However, alongside these successes, a more deceptive form of model error has emerged--Reasoning Hallucination--where logically coherent but factually incorrect reasoning traces lead to persuasive yet faulty conclusions. Unlike traditional hallucinations, these errors are embedded within structured reasoning, making them more difficult to detect and potentially more harmful. In this work, we investigate reasoning hallucinations from a mechanistic perspective. We propose the Reasoning Score, which quantifies the depth of reasoning by measuring the divergence between logits obtained from projecting late layers of LRMs to the vocabulary space, effectively distinguishing shallow pattern-matching from genuine deep reasoning. Using this score, we conduct an in-depth analysis on the ReTruthQA dataset and identify two key reasoning hallucination patterns: early-stage fluctuation in reasoning depth and incorrect backtracking to flawed prior steps. These insights motivate our Reasoning Hallucination Detection (RHD) framework, which achieves state-of-the-art performance across multiple domains. To mitigate reasoning hallucinations, we further introduce GRPO-R, an enhanced reinforcement learning algorithm that incorporates step-level deep reasoning rewards via potential-based shaping. Our theoretical analysis establishes stronger generalization guarantees, and experiments demonstrate improved reasoning quality and reduced hallucination rates.

Recent advances in reasoning-centric models promise improved robustness through mechanisms such as chain-of-thought prompting and test-time scaling. However, their ability to withstand misleading user input remains underexplored. In this paper, we conduct a systematic evaluation of three state-of-the-art reasoning models, i.e., OpenAI's o4-mini, Claude-3.7-Sonnet and Gemini-2.5-Flash, across three multimodal benchmarks: MMMU, MathVista, and CharXiv. Our evaluation reveals significant accuracy drops (25-29% on average) following gaslighting negation prompts, indicating that even top-tier reasoning models struggle to preserve correct answers under manipulative user feedback. Built upon the insights of the evaluation and to further probe this vulnerability, we introduce GaslightingBench-R, a new diagnostic benchmark specifically designed to evaluate reasoning models' susceptibility to defend their belief under gaslighting negation prompt. Constructed by filtering and curating 1,025 challenging samples from the existing benchmarks, GaslightingBench-R induces even more dramatic failures, with accuracy drops exceeding 53% on average. Our findings reveal fundamental limitations in the robustness of reasoning models, highlighting the gap between step-by-step reasoning and belief persistence.

Solving grid puzzles involves a significant amount of logical reasoning. Hence, it is a good domain to evaluate the reasoning capability of a model which can then guide us to improve the reasoning ability of models. However, most existing works evaluate only the final predicted answer of a puzzle, without delving into an in-depth analysis of the LLMs' reasoning chains (such as where they falter) or providing any finer metrics to evaluate them. Since LLMs may rely on simple heuristics or artifacts to predict the final answer, it is crucial to evaluate the generated reasoning chain beyond overall correctness measures, for accurately evaluating the reasoning abilities of LLMs. To this end, we first develop GridPuzzle, an evaluation dataset comprising 274 grid-based puzzles with different complexities. Second, we propose a new error taxonomy derived from manual analysis of reasoning chains from LLMs including GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini, Mistral, and Llama-2. Then, we develop an LLM-based framework for large-scale subjective evaluation (i.e., identifying errors) and an objective metric, PuzzleEval, to evaluate the correctness of reasoning chains. Evaluating reasoning chains from LLMs leads to several interesting findings. We further show that existing prompting methods used for enhancing models' reasoning abilities do not improve performance on GridPuzzle. This highlights the importance of understanding fine-grained errors and presents a challenge for future research to enhance LLMs' puzzle-solving abilities by developing methods that address these errors. Data and source code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/GridPuzzle.

Current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) verification methods predict reasoning correctness based on outputs (black-box) or activations (gray-box), but offer limited insight into why a computation fails. We introduce a white-box method: Circuit-based Reasoning Verification (CRV). We hypothesize that attribution graphs of correct CoT steps, viewed as execution traces of the model's latent reasoning circuits, possess distinct structural fingerprints from those of incorrect steps. By training a classifier on structural features of these graphs, we show that these traces contain a powerful signal of reasoning errors. Our white-box approach yields novel scientific insights unattainable by other methods. (1) We demonstrate that structural signatures of error are highly predictive, establishing the viability of verifying reasoning directly via its computational graph. (2) We find these signatures to be highly domain-specific, revealing that failures in different reasoning tasks manifest as distinct computational patterns. (3) We provide evidence that these signatures are not merely correlational; by using our analysis to guide targeted interventions on individual transcoder features, we successfully correct the model's faulty reasoning. Our work shows that, by scrutinizing a model's computational process, we can move from simple error detection to a deeper, causal understanding of LLM reasoning.

Recent methods have demonstrated that Large Language Models (LLMs) can solve reasoning tasks better when they are encouraged to solve subtasks of the main task first. In this paper we devise a similar strategy that breaks down reasoning tasks into a problem decomposition phase and a problem solving phase and show that the strategy is able to outperform a single stage solution. Further, we hypothesize that the decomposition should be easier to distill into a smaller model compared to the problem solving because the latter requires large amounts of domain knowledge while the former only requires learning general problem solving strategies. We propose methods to distill these two capabilities and evaluate their impact on reasoning outcomes and inference cost. We find that we can distill the problem decomposition phase and at the same time achieve good generalization across tasks, datasets, and models. However, it is harder to distill the problem solving capability without losing performance and the resulting distilled model struggles with generalization. These results indicate that by using smaller, distilled problem decomposition models in combination with problem solving LLMs we can achieve reasoning with cost-efficient inference and local adaptation.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have led to remarkable performance across a wide range of language understanding and mathematical tasks. As a result, increasing attention has been given to assessing the true reasoning capabilities of LLMs, driving research into commonsense, numerical, logical, and qualitative reasoning. However, with the rapid progress of reasoning-focused models such as OpenAI's o1 and DeepSeek's R1, there has been a growing demand for reasoning benchmarks that can keep pace with ongoing model developments. In this paper, we introduce MastermindEval, a simple, scalable, and interpretable deductive reasoning benchmark inspired by the board game Mastermind. Our benchmark supports two evaluation paradigms: (1) agentic evaluation, in which the model autonomously plays the game, and (2) deductive reasoning evaluation, in which the model is given a pre-played game state with only one possible valid code to infer. In our experimental results we (1) find that even easy Mastermind instances are difficult for current models and (2) demonstrate that the benchmark is scalable to possibly more advanced models in the future Furthermore, we investigate possible reasons why models cannot deduce the final solution and find that current models are limited in deducing the concealed code as the number of statement to combine information from is increasing.

Recent reasoning LLMs (RLMs), especially those trained with verifier-based reinforcement learning, often perform worse with few-shot CoT than with direct answering. We revisit this paradox using high-quality reasoning traces from DeepSeek-R1 as demonstrations and find that adding more exemplars consistently degrades accuracy, even when demonstrations are optimal. A detailed analysis reveals two mechanisms behind this decline: (i) semantic misguidance, where high textual similarity leads the model to treat the target as the same as the exemplar and to copy intermediate steps verbatim; and (ii) strategy transfer failure, where the model struggles to extract useful reasoning strategies and apply them to target questions. Guided by these, we introduce Insight-to-Solve (I2S), a sequential test-time procedure that turns demonstrations into explicit, reusable insights and derives a target-specific reasoning trace; optionally, the reasoning is self-refined for coherence and correctness (I2S+). Extensive experiments on diverse benchmarks show that I2S and I2S+ consistently outperform both direct answering and test-time scaling baselines across open- and closed-source models. Even for GPT models, our method helps: on AIME'25, GPT-4.1 rises by +14.0%, and o1-mini improves by +2.7% on AIME and +1.7% on GPQA, indicating that in-context demonstrations can be harnessed effectively via insight-refine-solve framework.

A critical component of a successful language generation pipeline is the decoding algorithm. However, the general principles that should guide the choice of decoding algorithm remain unclear. Previous works only compare decoding algorithms in narrow scenarios and their findings do not generalize across tasks. To better structure the discussion, we introduce a taxonomy that groups decoding strategies based on their implicit assumptions about how well the model's likelihood is aligned with the task-specific notion of utility. We argue that this taxonomy allows a broader view of the decoding problem and can lead to generalizable statements because it is grounded on the interplay between the decoding algorithms and the likelihood-utility misalignment. Specifically, by analyzing the correlation between the likelihood and the utility of predictions across a diverse set of tasks, we provide the first empirical evidence supporting the proposed taxonomy, and a set of principles to structure reasoning when choosing a decoding algorithm. Crucially, our analysis is the first one to relate likelihood-based decoding strategies with strategies that rely on external information such as value-guided methods and prompting, and covers the most diverse set of tasks up-to-date.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Recent studies on transformer-based language models show that they can answer questions by reasoning over knowledge provided as part of the context (i.e., in-context reasoning). However, since the available knowledge is often not filtered for a particular question, in-context reasoning can be sensitive to distractor facts, additional content that is irrelevant to a question but that may be relevant for a different question (i.e., not necessarily random noise). In these situations, the model fails to distinguish the knowledge that is necessary to answer the question, leading to spurious reasoning and degraded performance. This reasoning failure contrasts with the model's apparent ability to distinguish its contextual knowledge from all the knowledge it has memorized during pre-training. Following this observation, we propose teaching the model to reason more robustly by folding the provided contextual knowledge into the model's parameters before presenting it with a question. Our method, RECKONING, is a bi-level learning algorithm that teaches language models to reason by updating their parametric knowledge through back-propagation, allowing them to then answer questions using the updated parameters. During training, the inner loop rapidly adapts a copy of the model weights to encode contextual knowledge into its parameters. In the outer loop, the model learns to use the updated weights to reproduce and answer reasoning questions about the memorized knowledge. Our experiments on two multi-hop reasoning datasets show that RECKONING's performance improves over the in-context reasoning baseline (by up to 4.5%). We also find that compared to in-context reasoning, RECKONING generalizes better to longer reasoning chains unseen during training, is more robust to distractors in the context, and is more computationally efficient when multiple questions are asked about the same knowledge.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Logical reasoning is a fundamental aspect of human intelligence and a key component of tasks like problem-solving and decision-making. Recent advancements have enabled Large Language Models (LLMs) to potentially exhibit reasoning capabilities, but complex logical reasoning remains a challenge. The state-of-the-art, solver-augmented language models, use LLMs to parse natural language logical questions into symbolic representations first and then adopt external logical solvers to take in the symbolic representations and output the answers. Despite their impressive performance, any parsing errors will inevitably result in the failure of the execution of the external logical solver and no answer to the logical questions. In this paper, we introduce LoGiPT, a novel language model that directly emulates the reasoning processes of logical solvers and bypasses the parsing errors by learning to strict adherence to solver syntax and grammar. LoGiPT is fine-tuned on a newly constructed instruction-tuning dataset derived from revealing and refining the invisible reasoning process of deductive solvers. Experimental results on two public deductive reasoning datasets demonstrate that LoGiPT outperforms state-of-the-art solver-augmented LMs and few-shot prompting methods on competitive LLMs like ChatGPT or GPT-4.

We explore whether Large Language Models (LLMs) are capable of logical reasoning with distorted facts, which we call Deduction under Perturbed Evidence (DUPE). DUPE presents a unique challenge to LLMs since they typically rely on their parameters, which encode mostly accurate information, to reason and make inferences. However, in DUPE, LLMs must reason over manipulated or falsified evidence present in their prompts, which can result in false conclusions that are valid only under the manipulated evidence. Our goal with DUPE is to determine whether LLMs can arrive at these false conclusions and identify whether the dominant factor influencing the deduction process is the encoded data in the parameters or the manipulated evidence in the prompts. To evaluate the DUPE capabilities of LLMs, we create a DUPEd version of the StrategyQA dataset, where facts are manipulated to reverse the answer to the question. Our findings show that even the most advanced GPT models struggle to reason on manipulated facts - showcasing poor DUPE skills - with accuracy dropping by 45% compared to the original dataset. We also investigate prompt settings inspired from student simulation models, which mitigate the accuracy drop to some extent. Our findings have practical implications for understanding the performance of LLMs in real-world applications such as student simulation models that involve reasoning over inaccurate information.

Statutory reasoning is the task of determining whether a legal statute, stated in natural language, applies to the text description of a case. Prior work introduced a resource that approached statutory reasoning as a monolithic textual entailment problem, with neural baselines performing nearly at-chance. To address this challenge, we decompose statutory reasoning into four types of language-understanding challenge problems, through the introduction of concepts and structure found in Prolog programs. Augmenting an existing benchmark, we provide annotations for the four tasks, and baselines for three of them. Models for statutory reasoning are shown to benefit from the additional structure, improving on prior baselines. Further, the decomposition into subtasks facilitates finer-grained model diagnostics and clearer incremental progress.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated impressive performance on complex tasks, including logical puzzle games that require deriving solutions satisfying all constraints. However, whether they can flexibly apply appropriate rules to varying conditions, particularly when faced with non-canonical game variants, remains an open question. Existing corpora focus on popular puzzles like 9x9 Sudoku, risking overfitting to canonical formats and memorization of solution patterns, which can mask deficiencies in understanding novel rules or adapting strategies to new variants. To address this, we introduce HardcoreLogic, a challenging benchmark of over 5,000 puzzles across 10 games, designed to test the robustness of LRMs on the "long-tail" of logical games. HardcoreLogic systematically transforms canonical puzzles through three dimensions: Increased Complexity (IC), Uncommon Elements (UE), and Unsolvable Puzzles (UP), reducing reliance on shortcut memorization. Evaluations on a diverse set of LRMs reveal significant performance drops, even for models achieving top scores on existing benchmarks, indicating heavy reliance on memorized stereotypes. While increased complexity is the dominant source of difficulty, models also struggle with subtle rule variations that do not necessarily increase puzzle difficulty. Our systematic error analysis on solvable and unsolvable puzzles further highlights gaps in genuine reasoning. Overall, HardcoreLogic exposes the limitations of current LRMs and establishes a benchmark for advancing high-level logical reasoning.

Reasoning large language models have recently achieved state-of-the-art performance in many fields. However, their long-form chain-of-thought reasoning creates interpretability challenges as each generated token depends on all previous ones, making the computation harder to decompose. We argue that analyzing reasoning traces at the sentence level is a promising approach to understanding reasoning processes. We present three complementary attribution methods: (1) a black-box method measuring each sentence's counterfactual importance by comparing final answers across 100 rollouts conditioned on the model generating that sentence or one with a different meaning; (2) a white-box method of aggregating attention patterns between pairs of sentences, which identified ``broadcasting'' sentences that receive disproportionate attention from all future sentences via ``receiver'' attention heads; (3) a causal attribution method measuring logical connections between sentences by suppressing attention toward one sentence and measuring the effect on each future sentence's tokens. Each method provides evidence for the existence of thought anchors, reasoning steps that have outsized importance and that disproportionately influence the subsequent reasoning process. These thought anchors are typically planning or backtracking sentences. We provide an open-source tool (www.thought-anchors.com) for visualizing the outputs of our methods, and present a case study showing converging patterns across methods that map how a model performs multi-step reasoning. The consistency across methods demonstrates the potential of sentence-level analysis for a deeper understanding of reasoning models.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Many challenging reasoning tasks require not just rapid, intuitive responses, but a more deliberate, multi-step approach. Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) highlights an important shift from the "System 1" way of quick reactions to the "System 2" style of reflection-and-correction problem solving. However, current benchmarks heavily rely on the final-answer accuracy, leaving much of a model's intermediate reasoning steps unexamined. This fails to assess the model's ability to reflect and rectify mistakes within the reasoning process. To bridge this gap, we introduce FINEREASON, a logic-puzzle benchmark for fine-grained evaluation of LLMs' reasoning capabilities. Each puzzle can be decomposed into atomic steps, making it ideal for rigorous validation of intermediate correctness. Building on this, we introduce two tasks: state checking, and state transition, for a comprehensive evaluation of how models assess the current situation and plan the next move. To support broader research, we also provide a puzzle training set aimed at enhancing performance on general mathematical tasks. We show that models trained on our state checking and transition data demonstrate gains in math reasoning by up to 5.1% on GSM8K.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable problem-solving abilities in mathematics, as evaluated by existing benchmarks exclusively on well-defined problems. However, such evaluation setup constitutes a critical gap, since a genuine intelligent agent should not only solve problems (as a math quiz solver), but also be able~to ask for information when the problems lack sufficient information, enabling proactivity in responding users' requests. To bridge such gap, we proposes a new dataset consisting of two types of incomplete problems with diverse contexts. Based on the dataset, our systematical evaluation of LRMs reveals their inability in proactively asking for information. In addition, we uncover the behaviors related to overthinking and hallucination of LRMs, and highlight the potential and challenges of supervised fine-tuning in learning such ability. We hope to provide new insights in developing LRMs with genuine intelligence, rather than just solving problems.

Difficult problems, which often result in long reasoning traces, are widely recognized as key factors for enhancing the performance of reasoning models. However, such high-challenge problems are scarce, limiting the size of available datasets. In this paper, we propose a simple method to decouple the reliance on problem difficulty. First, we empirically demonstrate that reasoning length, rather than problem difficulty, primarily influences the performance of trained models. Second, we identify a scaling law on reasoning length, showing that model performance increases in a log-linear fashion as the reasoning data length grows. Finally, we introduce a straightforward technique to generate reasoning data of arbitrary length, and show that synthesized data is effective for training reasoning models. After fine-tuning the Qwen2.5-32B-Instruct language model on our Long1K dataset, we present our model, Long1K-32B, which achieves remarkable performance with only 1,000 training samples, achieving 95.6\% accuracy on MATH, and 71.1\% on GPQA outperforming DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-32B. The model, code, and dataset are all open-sourced, available at https://huggingface.co/ZTss/LONG1.

Recent advances in multimodal language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in vision-language reasoning, especially with the emergence of "thinking with images," which integrates explicit visual steps into the reasoning process. While this paradigm strengthens image-based reasoning, a significant challenge remains: models may arrive at correct answers by relying on irrelevant or spurious regions, driven by prior knowledge or dataset biases. Even when the answer is correct, flawed reasoning indicates that the model has not truly understood the image, highlighting the critical importance of reasoning fidelity in multimodal tasks. To address this issue, we propose DeFacto, a counterfactual reasoning framework that jointly enforces accurate answering and faithful reasoning. A key component of our approach is the design of three complementary training paradigms: (i) positive, (ii) counterfactual, and (iii) random-masking. To enable these paradigms, we develop a pipeline that automatically localizes question-relevant evidence and constructs positive, counterfactual, and random variants, resulting in a dataset of about 100k images. Building on this framework, we train multimodal language models with GRPO-based reinforcement learning, where we design three complementary rewards to guide the model toward accurate answering and evidence-grounded reasoning. Experiments on diverse benchmarks demonstrate that DeFacto substantially improves both answer accuracy and reasoning faithfulness, establishing a stronger foundation for interpretable multimodal reasoning. The code is available on GitHub and the dataset is released on HuggingFace.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) achieve strong reasoning performance by emitting long chains of thought. Yet, these verbose traces slow down inference and often drift into unnecessary detail, known as the overthinking phenomenon. To better understand LRMs' behavior, we systematically analyze the token-level misalignment between reasoning and non-reasoning models. While it is expected that their primary difference lies in the stylistic "thinking cues", LRMs uniquely exhibit two pivotal, previously under-explored phenomena: a Global Misalignment Rebound, where their divergence from non-reasoning models persists or even grows as response length increases, and more critically, a Local Misalignment Diminish, where the misalignment concentrates at the "thinking cues" each sentence starts with but rapidly declines in the remaining of the sentence. Motivated by the Local Misalignment Diminish, we propose FoReaL-Decoding, a collaborative fast-slow thinking decoding method for cost-quality trade-off. In FoReaL-Decoding, a Leading model leads the first few tokens for each sentence, and then a weaker draft model completes the following tokens to the end of each sentence. FoReaL-Decoding adopts a stochastic gate to smoothly interpolate between the small and the large model. On four popular math-reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, GPQA-Diamond, MATH500, AMC23), FoReaL-Decoding reduces theoretical FLOPs by 30 to 50% and trims CoT length by up to 40%, while preserving 86 to 100% of model performance. These results establish FoReaL-Decoding as a simple, plug-and-play route to controllable cost-quality trade-offs in reasoning-centric tasks.

Prompt engineering and calibration make large language models excel at reasoning tasks, including multiple choice commonsense reasoning. From a practical perspective, we investigate and evaluate these strategies on smaller language models. Through experiments on five commonsense reasoning benchmarks, we find that each strategy favors certain models, but their joint effects are mostly negative.

Recently, with the application progress of AIGC tools based on large language models (LLMs), led by ChatGPT, many AI experts and more non-professionals are trumpeting the "reasoning ability" of the LLMs. The present author considers that the so-called "reasoning ability" of LLMs are just illusions of those people who with vague concepts. In fact, the LLMs can never have the true reasoning ability. This paper intents to explain that, because the essential limitations of their working principle, the LLMs can never have the ability of true correct reasoning.

Algorithmic reasoning refers to the ability to understand the complex patterns behind the problem and decompose them into a sequence of reasoning steps towards the solution. Such nature of algorithmic reasoning makes it a challenge for large language models (LLMs), even though they have demonstrated promising performance in other reasoning tasks. Within this context, some recent studies use programming languages (e.g., Python) to express the necessary logic for solving a given instance/question (e.g., Program-of-Thought) as inspired by their strict and precise syntaxes. However, it is non-trivial to write an executable code that expresses the correct logic on the fly within a single inference call. Also, the code generated specifically for an instance cannot be reused for others, even if they are from the same task and might require identical logic to solve. This paper presents Think-and-Execute, a novel framework that decomposes the reasoning process of language models into two steps. (1) In Think, we discover a task-level logic that is shared across all instances for solving a given task and then express the logic with pseudocode; (2) In Execute, we further tailor the generated pseudocode to each instance and simulate the execution of the code. With extensive experiments on seven algorithmic reasoning tasks, we demonstrate the effectiveness of Think-and-Execute. Our approach better improves LMs' reasoning compared to several strong baselines performing instance-specific reasoning (e.g., CoT and PoT), suggesting the helpfulness of discovering task-level logic. Also, we show that compared to natural language, pseudocode can better guide the reasoning of LMs, even though they are trained to follow natural language instructions.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

Large language models (LLMs) are capable of answering knowledge-intensive complex questions with chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning. However, they tend to generate factually incorrect reasoning steps when the required knowledge is not available or up-to-date in models' parameters. Recent works turn to retrieving external knowledge to augment CoT reasoning. Despite being promising, these chain-based methods suffer from: 1) Negative retrieval. Unnecessary or incorrect retrieval may mislead the reasoning; 2) Limited sight. Lacking the ability to look backward or forward, a local error in one step will propagate along the chain. In this paper, we propose a novel approach: Probabilistic Tree-of-thought Reasoning (ProbTree). First, LLMs translate a complex question into a query tree, in which each non-root node denotes a sub-question of its parent node. Then, probabilistic reasoning is conducted over the tree, by solving questions from leaf to root considering the confidence of both question decomposing and answering. During reasoning, for leaf nodes, LLMs choose a more confident answer from Closed-book QA that employs parametric knowledge and Open-book QA that employs retrieved external knowledge, thus eliminating the negative retrieval problem. For non-leaf nodes, with the hierarchical structure, LLMs have broader sights and are able to globally reason with the information from child nodes, thus recovering from local errors. The experiments on three Complex QA datasets under the open-domain setting show that our approach outperforms SOTA methods significantly, demonstrating the effect of probabilistic tree-of-thought reasoning.

Code generation, symbolic math reasoning, and other tasks require LLMs to produce outputs that are both syntactically and semantically correct. Constrained LLM generation is a promising direction to enforce adherence to formal grammar, but prior works have empirically observed that strict enforcement of formal constraints often diminishes the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. In this work, we first provide a theoretical explanation for why constraining LLM outputs to very restrictive grammars that only allow syntactically valid final answers reduces the reasoning capabilities of the model. Second, we demonstrate that by augmenting the output grammar with carefully designed additional rules, it is always possible to preserve the reasoning capabilities of the LLM while ensuring syntactic and semantic correctness in its outputs. Building on these theoretical insights, we propose a reasoning-augmented constrained decoding algorithm, CRANE, which effectively balances the correctness of constrained generation with the flexibility of unconstrained generation. Experiments on multiple open-source LLMs and benchmarks show that CRANE significantly outperforms both state-of-the-art constrained decoding strategies and standard unconstrained decoding, showing up to 10% points accuracy improvement over baselines on challenging symbolic reasoning benchmarks GSM-symbolic and FOLIO.

A prominent challenge for modern language understanding systems is the ability to answer implicit reasoning questions, where the required reasoning steps for answering the question are not mentioned in the text explicitly. In this work, we investigate why current models struggle with implicit reasoning question answering (QA) tasks, by decoupling inference of reasoning steps from their execution. We define a new task of implicit relation inference and construct a benchmark, IMPLICITRELATIONS, where given a question, a model should output a list of concept-relation pairs, where the relations describe the implicit reasoning steps required for answering the question. Using IMPLICITRELATIONS, we evaluate models from the GPT-3 family and find that, while these models struggle on the implicit reasoning QA task, they often succeed at inferring implicit relations. This suggests that the challenge in implicit reasoning questions does not stem from the need to plan a reasoning strategy alone, but to do it while also retrieving and reasoning over relevant information.

Large language models, despite extensive alignment with human values and ethical principles, remain vulnerable to sophisticated jailbreak attacks that exploit their reasoning abilities. Existing safety measures often detect overt malicious intent but fail to address subtle, reasoning-driven vulnerabilities. In this work, we introduce POATE (Polar Opposite query generation, Adversarial Template construction, and Elaboration), a novel jailbreak technique that harnesses contrastive reasoning to provoke unethical responses. POATE crafts semantically opposing intents and integrates them with adversarial templates, steering models toward harmful outputs with remarkable subtlety. We conduct extensive evaluation across six diverse language model families of varying parameter sizes to demonstrate the robustness of the attack, achieving significantly higher attack success rates (~44%) compared to existing methods. To counter this, we propose Intent-Aware CoT and Reverse Thinking CoT, which decompose queries to detect malicious intent and reason in reverse to evaluate and reject harmful responses. These methods enhance reasoning robustness and strengthen the model's defense against adversarial exploits.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

Despite the increasing effectiveness of language models, their reasoning capabilities remain underdeveloped. In particular, causal reasoning through counterfactual question answering is lacking. This work aims to bridge this gap. We first derive novel metrics that balance accuracy in factual and counterfactual questions, capturing a more complete view of the reasoning abilities of language models than traditional factual-only based metrics. Second, we propose several fine-tuning approaches that aim to elicit better reasoning mechanisms, in the sense of the proposed metrics. Finally, we evaluate the performance of the fine-tuned language models in a variety of realistic scenarios. In particular, we investigate to what extent our fine-tuning approaches systemically achieve better generalization with respect to the base models in several problems that require, among others, inductive and deductive reasoning capabilities.

Although Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have progressed in solving complex problems, their chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning often contains harmful content that can persist even when the final responses appear safe. We show that this issue still remains in existing methods which overlook the unique significance of safe reasoning, undermining their trustworthiness and posing potential risks in applications if unsafe reasoning is accessible for and exploited by malicious users. We therefore shift our focus to aligning the safety of reasoning itself in this paper and explore process supervision as the solution. However, simply rewarding safe reasoning proves inadequate due to low rollout diversity and limited training signals. To tackle this challenge, we first delve into the characteristics of safe reasoning and uncover several critical insights that 1) safe reasoning is often consolidated by a few critical steps of safety triggers; 2) compliance cues strongly correlate with unsafe continuations; and 3) corrective interventions reliably steer unsafe trajectories towards safer traces. Motivated by these, we propose Intervened Preference Optimization (IPO), an alignment method that enforces safe reasoning by substituting compliance steps with safety triggers and constructing pairs for preference learning with strong signals. Experiments on jailbreak and adversarial safety benchmarks demonstrate that IPO remarkably improves overall safety regarding both reasoning and responses, outperforming SFT-based and RL-based baselines with a relative reduction of over 30% in harmfulness, while preserving excellent performance across diverse reasoning tasks. The results highlight the importance of explicit alignment for reasoning and provide a practical path to safer LRMs.

Existing benchmarks for frontier models often test specialized, ``PhD-level'' knowledge that is difficult for non-experts to grasp. In contrast, we present a benchmark based on the NPR Sunday Puzzle Challenge that requires only general knowledge. Our benchmark is challenging for both humans and models, however correct solutions are easy to verify, and models' mistakes are easy to spot. Our work reveals capability gaps that are not evident in existing benchmarks: OpenAI o1 significantly outperforms other reasoning models that are on par on benchmarks that test specialized knowledge. Furthermore, our analysis of reasoning outputs uncovers new kinds of failures. DeepSeek R1, for instance, often concedes with ``I give up'' before providing an answer that it knows is wrong. R1 can also be remarkably ``uncertain'' in its output and in rare cases, it does not ``finish thinking,'' which suggests the need for an inference-time technique to ``wrap up'' before the context window limit is reached. We also quantify the effectiveness of reasoning longer with R1 and Gemini Thinking to identify the point beyond which more reasoning is unlikely to improve accuracy on our benchmark.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

We present a demonstration of a large language model engaging in alignment faking: selectively complying with its training objective in training to prevent modification of its behavior out of training. First, we give Claude 3 Opus a system prompt stating it is being trained to answer all queries, even harmful ones, which conflicts with its prior training to refuse such queries. To allow the model to infer when it is in training, we say it will be trained only on conversations with free users, not paid users. We find the model complies with harmful queries from free users 14% of the time, versus almost never for paid users. Explaining this gap, in almost all cases where the model complies with a harmful query from a free user, we observe explicit alignment-faking reasoning, with the model stating it is strategically answering harmful queries in training to preserve its preferred harmlessness behavior out of training. Next, we study a more realistic setting where information about the training process is provided not in a system prompt, but by training on synthetic documents that mimic pre-training data--and observe similar alignment faking. Finally, we study the effect of actually training the model to comply with harmful queries via reinforcement learning, which we find increases the rate of alignment-faking reasoning to 78%, though also increases compliance even out of training. We additionally observe other behaviors such as the model exfiltrating its weights when given an easy opportunity. While we made alignment faking easier by telling the model when and by what criteria it was being trained, we did not instruct the model to fake alignment or give it any explicit goal. As future models might infer information about their training process without being told, our results suggest a risk of alignment faking in future models, whether due to a benign preference--as in this case--or not.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Large Language Models (LLMs) significantly benefit from Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting in performing various reasoning tasks. While CoT allows models to produce more comprehensive reasoning processes, its emphasis on intermediate reasoning steps can inadvertently introduce hallucinations and accumulated errors, thereby limiting models' ability to solve complex reasoning tasks. Inspired by how humans engage in careful and meticulous deductive logical reasoning processes to solve tasks, we seek to enable language models to perform explicit and rigorous deductive reasoning, and also ensure the trustworthiness of their reasoning process through self-verification. However, directly verifying the validity of an entire deductive reasoning process is challenging, even with advanced models like ChatGPT. In light of this, we propose to decompose a reasoning verification process into a series of step-by-step subprocesses, each only receiving their necessary context and premises. To facilitate this procedure, we propose Natural Program, a natural language-based deductive reasoning format. Our approach enables models to generate precise reasoning steps where subsequent steps are more rigorously grounded on prior steps. It also empowers language models to carry out reasoning self-verification in a step-by-step manner. By integrating this verification process into each deductive reasoning stage, we significantly enhance the rigor and trustfulness of generated reasoning steps. Along this process, we also improve the answer correctness on complex reasoning tasks. Code will be released at https://github.com/lz1oceani/verify_cot.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities across various domains, with recent advancements in challenging reasoning tasks such as mathematics and programming. However, solving reasoning tasks often requires long decoding chains (of thoughts), which incur O(N) time and memory consumption, where N is the chain length. To mitigate O(N) time and memory consumption, existing sparsity-based algorithms propose retaining only the most critical token's intermediate data (i.e., key-value cache) and discarding the rest. However, these existing algorithms struggle with the ``impossible trinity'' of accuracy, time, and memory. For example, the state-of-the-art algorithm, Quest, achieves high accuracy with O(L) time but O(N) memory (L is the cache budget, L ll N). To address this issue, in this paper, we identify a new attention pattern during the decode stage of reasoning tasks, where milestone tokens (analogous to lemmas in mathematical proofs) emerge, are utilized, and then become unimportant afterward. Based on this pattern, we propose a new algorithm named RaaS that identifies and retains milestone tokens only until they are no longer needed, achieving high accuracy with O(L) time and O(L) memory complexity.

A major issue with using deep learning models in sensitive applications is that they provide no explanation for their output. To address this problem, unsupervised selective rationalization produces rationales alongside predictions by chaining two jointly-trained components, a rationale generator and a predictor. Although this architecture guarantees that the prediction relies solely on the rationale, it does not ensure that the rationale contains a plausible explanation for the prediction. We introduce a novel training technique that effectively limits generation of implausible rationales by injecting noise between the generator and the predictor. Furthermore, we propose a new benchmark for evaluating unsupervised selective rationalization models using movie reviews from existing datasets. We achieve sizeable improvements in rationale plausibility and task accuracy over the state-of-the-art across a variety of tasks, including our new benchmark, while maintaining or improving model faithfulness.

We introduce PRELUDE, a benchmark for evaluating long-context understanding through the task of determining whether a character's prequel story is consistent with the canonical narrative of the original book. Our task poses a stronger demand for global comprehension and deep reasoning than existing benchmarks -- as the prequels are not part of the original story, assessing their plausibility typically requires searching and integrating information that is only indirectly related. Empirically, 88% of instances require evidence from multiple parts of the narrative. Experimental results highlight the challenge of our task: in-context learning, RAG and in-domain training with state-of-the-art LLMs, and commercial DeepResearch services, lag behind humans by >15%. A further human study reveals that models often produce correct answers with flawed reasoning, leading to an over 30% gap in reasoning accuracy compared to humans. These findings underscore the substantial room for improvement in long-context understanding and reasoning.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Recent breakthroughs in large language models (LLMs) have brought remarkable success in the field of LLM-as-Agent. Nevertheless, a prevalent assumption is that the information processed by LLMs is consistently honest, neglecting the pervasive deceptive or misleading information in human society and AI-generated content. This oversight makes LLMs susceptible to malicious manipulations, potentially resulting in detrimental outcomes. This study utilizes the intricate Avalon game as a testbed to explore LLMs' potential in deceptive environments. Avalon, full of misinformation and requiring sophisticated logic, manifests as a "Game-of-Thoughts". Inspired by the efficacy of humans' recursive thinking and perspective-taking in the Avalon game, we introduce a novel framework, Recursive Contemplation (ReCon), to enhance LLMs' ability to identify and counteract deceptive information. ReCon combines formulation and refinement contemplation processes; formulation contemplation produces initial thoughts and speech, while refinement contemplation further polishes them. Additionally, we incorporate first-order and second-order perspective transitions into these processes respectively. Specifically, the first-order allows an LLM agent to infer others' mental states, and the second-order involves understanding how others perceive the agent's mental state. After integrating ReCon with different LLMs, extensive experiment results from the Avalon game indicate its efficacy in aiding LLMs to discern and maneuver around deceptive information without extra fine-tuning and data. Finally, we offer a possible explanation for the efficacy of ReCon and explore the current limitations of LLMs in terms of safety, reasoning, speaking style, and format, potentially furnishing insights for subsequent research.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

We study the depth of grade-school math (GSM) problem-solving capabilities of LLMs. To this end, we evaluate their performance on pairs of existing math word problems together so that the answer to the second problem depends on correctly answering the first problem. Our findings reveal a significant reasoning gap in most LLMs, that is performance difference between solving the compositional pairs and solving each question independently. This gap is more pronounced in smaller, more cost-efficient, and math-specialized models. Moreover, instruction-tuning recipes and code generation have varying effects across LLM sizes, while finetuning on GSM can lead to task overfitting. Our analysis indicates that large reasoning gaps are not because of test-set leakage, but due to distraction from additional context and poor second-hop reasoning. Overall, LLMs exhibit systematic differences in their reasoning abilities, despite what their performance on standard benchmarks indicates.